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Floyd in Retrospect
John H. Tibbetts 
Emergency ofﬁ cials are always searching for glitch-es in their disaster plans. Drills are rarely sufﬁ -
cient. Sooner or later, planners must experience the real 
thing—the major disaster—to ﬁ nd the inevitable kinks 
in their systems. And that’s what [Hurricane] Floyd did 
[in September 1999]: it exposed some ﬂ aws in hurri-
cane preparedness that the state is working to ﬁ x. 
For many evacuees, the most glaring ﬂ aw was a lack 
of reversed lanes on major highways. Since Floyd, the 
S.C. Department of Public Safety has developed work-
able lane reversals for I-26 between Charleston and 
Columbia, U.S. 17 south in Georgetown County, and 
U.S. 278 in Beaufort County. If a giant storm threatens 
South Carolina anytime soon, the governor would prob-
ably reverse lanes of I-26 and perhaps other highways, 
experts say. Each state from Texas to North Carolina, 
moreover, plans to reverse at least one road in case of a 
major storm. 
South Carolina emergency personnel and law-enforce-
ment agencies also now have better communications 
tools, with improved two-way radio equipment and 
coordination among agencies. “We’ll be able to talk 
to who we need to, when we need to,” says [Lt. Col.] 
Stubbleﬁ eld [of the South Carolina Highway Patrol].
The state has expanded its trafﬁ c-monitoring capabili-
ties with 34 closed-circuit television cameras on hur-
ricane routes, aircraft, and automated speed detectors. 
Trafﬁ c information will be relayed to the state emergen-
cy operations center. From there, emergency managers 
can send messages via cell phone to solar-powered 
highway signs, which guide evacuees to less congested 
routes, according to Dick Jenkins, an engineer with the 
S.C. Department of Transportation. The state will roll 
out portable roadside radio transmitters that provide de-
tailed trafﬁ c information. 
The idea is “to keep people moving,” says Stubbleﬁ eld, 
“so they are able to get on and off the interstate at will, 
to ﬁ nd food and refuge, rather than being stacked up.”
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Next time, federal trafﬁ c experts will monitor any multi-
state evacuation. A special team led by federal highway 
ofﬁ cials will gather at FEMA’s Atlanta regional head-
quarters to coordinate information during a major storm 
that sends people scurrying across multiple state lines. 
In the past, “federal highway ofﬁ cials were not major 
players in hurricane evacuation planning, but that situ-
ation has improved dramatically,” says [Jay] Baker, [a 
Florida State University geographer who studies evacu-
ations].
The team will employ a Web-based program called the 
Evacuation Trafﬁ c Information System (ETIS), which 
relies on built-in data from hurricane evacuation stud-
ies and real-time information from states and counties 
on tourism occupancy, trafﬁ c counts, evacuation par-
ticipation rates, and other data. The program, display-
ing information on an interactive map, predicts trafﬁ c 
volumes across a multi-state region. Hurricane program 
managers at state emergency-operations centers will 
view the map at the same time. Thus, if there is a huge 
northward movement of people from Florida and Geor-
gia next time, South Carolina will have early warning. 
Southeastern states have conducted two major exercis-
es to test the ETIS program. The system, says Lewis, 
seemed to work well, though “we’ve not had a major 
hurricane requiring a big evacuation during the past two 
years, so it hasn’t been tested in real time.” 
When each hurricane season begins on June 1, the 
S.C. Emergency Management Division disseminates 
500,000 evacuation maps, offering route guidance for 
each coastal region. In a voluntary evacuation, travelers 
can take any road they wish. But once the governor an-
nounces a mandatory evacuation, law enforcement will 
likely guide many travelers to pre-determined routes. 
“We put a lot of effort into making sure that we can 
maintain trafﬁ c ﬂ ow, as much as we possibly can, on the 
routes we’ve determined to be evacuation routes,” says 
Stubbleﬁ eld. “If people deviate from those routes—if 
they know short cuts or they think have a better way—
they’ll run into a (trafﬁ c) problem. Please use the routes 
that we’ve designated unless you’re told otherwise 
through public information that we provide.” 
Not every state vulnerable to hurricanes learned lessons 
from Floyd. “There are states where evacuees are on 
their own,” where people receive little guidance from 
government about the best routes to take, says Lewis. 
“Then there are other states that are really getting their 
acts together.” South Carolina is one of the latter. Lewis 
says, “There is no state that has better preparation for 
hurricane evacuations.”
For an evacuation to work smoothly, emergency man-
agers must do their jobs efﬁ ciently, citizens must heed 
evacuation orders promptly, and the hurricane must stay 
offshore long enough to allow people to escape. 
Government, however, can’t evacuate the entire South 
Carolina coastline as quickly as many would like. An 
estimated 64 percent of South Carolina’s coastal resi-
dents—591,000 to 673,000 people—left their homes 
during Floyd over two days, according to a study by 
the University of South Carolina Hazards Research 
Lab. “When you’re trying to move as many people as 
we’re trying to move, there will be some delays,” says 
William Winn, emergency manager for Beaufort Coun-
ty. “If people want to avoid those delays, they need to 
leave earlier. If everybody tries to get on the road at the 
same time, we’re going to have problems.”
Too many people squeezing onto too few roads—there’s 
the rub. Each year, thousands of new residents migrate 
to the South Carolina coast, but our highway systems 
can’t keep pace. Horry County’s population swelled by 
37 percent in the 1990s, Beaufort County by 40 percent, 
and the Charleston metropolitan area by eight percent. 
And tourism in the coastal plain is ﬂ ourishing. The 
Grand Strand alone routinely attracts 400,000 tourists 
on summer weekends and up to a half-million on Labor 
Day weekend. 
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“Coastal population growth is outstripping the trans-
portation network’s capacity to efﬁ ciently handle all the 
trafﬁ c,” says [Jon] Boettcher [of the S.C. Emergency 
Management Division]. “Trafﬁ c engineers are con-
stantly looking for new routes, better ways to do things, 
better ways to gather evacuation information. But the 
road infrastructure just isn’t there.”
The number of vehicles on the road during evacuations 
has grown even faster than the coastal population. Dur-
ing Floyd, about 25 percent of households from the 
Charleston area evacuated in more than one vehicle. 
“One of the reasons that the roads were so clogged was 
because people were taking more than one car,” says 
Susan L. Cutter, a geographer at the University of South 
Carolina who studies evacuation behavior. Many fami-
lies also hauled boats or recreational vehicles, adding 
to congestion. “People were evacuating as a household 
unit, but they were traveling in separate cars and com-
municating by cell phone, doing it in a caravan.”
Leave Early!
The best evacuation plan in the world, experts say, won’t 
work if citizens fail to leave dangerous places early. 
If you’re thinking about escaping the coast during 
the next hurricane, remember one thing: leave before 
you’re ordered to go. That is, leave early—at least 36 to 
48 hours before a major storm’s expected landfall—if 
you live in a ﬂ ood-prone house or a mobile home in a 
coastal area. Leave early if you think your house can’t 
bear up to hurricane-force winds. Leave early if you 
have special needs—an elderly relative, for example, 
who can’t cope with hours stuck in trafﬁ c.
It’s important to leave early because tropical cyclones 
are unpredictable. Hurricane forecasts have become 
more accurate over the past 30 years due to improved 
computer models and satellite information. But when 
the National Hurricane Center forecasters estimate that 
a hurricane would strike 24 hours before landfall, they 
still have an average error of nearly 70 miles. At 48 
hours before landfall, they have an average error of al-
most 130 miles. At 72 hours, they have an error of 200 
miles. A hurricane expected to strike a couple hundred 
miles from your house three days hence could turn and 
hit you instead. 
Forecasting inaccuracies are inevitable, given tropical 
cyclones’ erratic temperaments. Hurricanes can turn 
on a dime, loop crazily, and abruptly speed up or slow 
down. Tropical cyclones can intensify dramatically and 
suddenly, but scientists still have the greatest difﬁ culty 
in forecasting storm intensity, says Stacy R. Stewart, a 
hurricane specialist with the National Hurricane Center. 
Andrew and Hugo each grew from a category 2 to a 
category 4 storm in less than 12 hours. 
Twenty-four hours before landfall, a hurricane could 
be a dawdling category 2. Just before it comes ashore, 
however, it could speed up and intensify to a category 
4, driving ﬂ oodwaters much farther inland than antici-
pated. People who stay home expecting a relatively 
mild hurricane could face a massive storm—and then 
it’d be too late to leave.
An evacuation order must be issued far in advance of 
a storm eye coming ashore. That way, residents have 
enough time to travel to a safe location before the ar-
rival of gale-force winds (39 miles per hour). To ensure 
public safety, emergency planners want everyone off 
the road 15 to 24 hours before the storm’s eye makes 
landfall, depending on the storm’s forward speed. 
Emergency planners must also factor in a community’s 
clearance time—the time needed to move all residents 
and tourists who want to leave to higher ground or safe 
shelter. During a major hurricane threat, Horry County, 
for example, requires a clearance time of about 24 hours 
to evacuate its peak coastal population. 
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All told, a mandatory evacuation might have to start 48 
hours before a major storm strikes a community. Yet 
vulnerable residents and tourists should leave the coast-
line during the voluntary evacuation, which precedes 
the governor’s mandatory order. 
“If people who are in harm’s way wait for a governor’s 
mandatory order to evacuate, then they’re missing the 
boat, it’s too late,” says Dennis Clark, emergency man-
ager for Charleston County. 
Waiting for a mandatory order heightens your risks of 
getting stuck on the highway network. When Floyd 
roared up the coastline, thousands of cars heading west 
and north from Jacksonville, Florida, were still stuck in 
trafﬁ c jams. Floyd, a category 4 hurricane at that time, 
could have made landfall in northeastern Florida, catch-
ing them on the road. At 100 miles per hour—the wind 
speed of a category 2 hurricane—wind pressures can 
begin lifting cars, says Baker. 
That’s the nightmare of every emergency manager in a 
hurricane-prone area: thousands of evacuees trapped in 
cars thrown around like toys by high winds.
But leaving early isn’t easy. One-third of Charleston-
area residents polled by Florida State University re-
searchers reported that someone in their household had 
to work during the Floyd evacuation, and many said it 
delayed their departure. 
“A lot of employers, during both Hugo and Floyd, told 
their workers to come in to work that morning, dur-
ing the voluntary evacuation,” says Clark. “They said 
they would let workers go at mid-day. So you had a lot 
of folks who were hitting the road when they got off 
work,” and they drove immediately into the worst of the 
congestion. “Plenty of those people would’ve already 
left home ten hours earlier if they’d had the chance.” 
Who Should Go?
The largest evacuation in American history was also the 
largest “over-evacuation,” some experts say. Many who 
ran from Floyd probably did not need to. Meanwhile, 
many vulnerable people who should have evacuated did 
not leave.
About one-half of the 3.5 million evacuees in the four-
state region were actually ordered to leave, [William] 
Massey [hurricane program manager for the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency] points out. Only a 
narrow strip of Florida’s eastern coastline was evacuated 
under mandatory orders, yet frightened inland dwellers 
from places like Orlando, a hundred miles from the sea, 
also ﬂ ed north. Many upland dwellers in South Carolina 
left town, although the governor evacuated primarily 
low-lying areas under a mandatory order.
People who live in solidly built homes on high ground 
but who relocate anyway are called “shadow” evacuees, 
in the parlance of emergency managers. Shadow evacu-
ees greatly exacerbated the massive multi-state trafﬁ c 
jam during Floyd, making it more difﬁ cult for the most 
vulnerable people to get out of harm’s way.
Yet emergency ofﬁ cials “are not very aggressive about 
telling people (who live in upland areas in well-built 
homes) not to evacuate,” says Baker. “Maybe they’re 
afraid of being sued.” Or maybe they’re afraid to have 
deaths and injuries on their conscience. “What if you 
tell someone ‘Don’t leave’ and then a tree falls through 
their house and kills them?” asks Massey. 
The South Carolina coast, with its many creeks and riv-
ers, complicates individual evacuation decisions. Un-
der a worst-case scenario during a category 4 storm, 
some Charleston-area neighborhoods along the rivers 
20 miles inland from the coast can face a dangerous 
storm surge, according to a Jan. 2001 study by the U.S. 
Army Corps of Engineers. As a storm surge is driven 
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into a river basin, it can pile up higher and higher as the 
basin narrows. “A lot of people aren’t aware of how far 
surge can go inland,” says [Stacy R.] Stewart [a hur-
ricane specialist with the National Hurricane Center]. 
To learn if you live in a ﬂ ood-hazard area, contact your 
insurer or local planning and zoning department. 
For now, the Palmetto State has enough roadways to 
evacuate all coastal residents and tourists, regardless of 
whether they live or play along the beachfront or in a 
well-built structure on high ground 30 miles from the 
shoreline. But can South Carolina’s transportation net-
work keep pace with an ever-growing coastal popula-
tion? Can the regional transportation highway network 
cope with population increases along the coast from 
South Florida to North Carolina? 
Floyd’s track, after all, was not so unusual. Hurricanes 
Bertha and Fran also traveled north up the coast, threat-
ening Florida, then Georgia, then South Carolina, be-
fore striking North Carolina. “The only difference is 
that Bertha and Fran were not very strong storms when 
they made the pass” up the coast, says Massey. “The 
Floyd track was a pretty common track if you look at 
history and climatology.” We should expect and plan for 
another multi-state evacuation like the one for Floyd, he 
says. 
But the effectiveness of the next major hurricane re-
sponse will “depend on how quickly people follow 
the recommendations by state government to evacuate 
early and along designated routes,” says Stubbleﬁ eld. 
“If people wait until the last minute to get on the road 
network and we have a tremendous number doing that 
at one time, it’ll be difﬁ cult.” 
Vacationers with children evacuate earliest of all. “Fam-
ily vacationers will be gone from the area quickly,” says 
Paul Whitten, director of public safety for Horry Coun-
ty. “They’ll say, ‘I don’t need this.’” During summer 
months, hurricane-evacuation routes ﬁ ll up rapidly with 
family tourists heading out of town. 
It’s the old-timers, people who have lived on the coast 
for 10 or more years, who are most resistant to leaving 
for a hurricane, says Whitten. “You have people on the 
front beach who will not evacuate.” 
Some homeowners in ﬂ oodprone areas remain stub-
bornly blind to the risks they face. “Some people want 
to stay with their homes,” says Stacy R. Stewart, a hur-
ricane specialist with the National Hurricane Center. 
“They say, ‘I put my life into it.’ Yes, but they may liter-
ally put their lives into it.” 
Resources
Visit the Coastal Heritage Magazine web site at 
http://www.scseagrant.org/library/library_pubs_
ch.htm.
